1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AD1 Formosa AD1

631



Reduce AC to BC

[Facing p. 15]

4:Grajdanzev--3 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 131, 631, 177.63 Japan
636.63

"The area of Taiwan, excluding the islands around it, is 35,760 sq. km. (13,807 sq. miles), a little more than the area of the Netherlands, or one-third as large as Virginia, and almost equal to the area of Kyushu or the Japanese part of Saghalien. The island stretches from north to south, the distance from its northern-most point to its southern promontory being 400 km. (249 miles) and, from east to west at the broadest part, 150 km. (93 miles). As an administrative area the Taiwan government-general includes adjacent islands and the Pescadores. The total number of these islands is 76, but their total area is only 64 sq. km. Recently the Spratley Islands off the coast of Indo-China were made a part of the territory of the government-general, but as yet they have not been adequately surveyed."

4:Grajdanzev--132-133 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 631, 652, 177.65 Japan
636.65

"First of all let us compare the gross revenue of the government-general, provinces and municipalities, in order to secure a clear idea of their relative importance. [133]

Public Revenues for 1939 (Budget Estimates) (1)

1. Of course, there are probably cases of double counting in this table, e.g. a grant-in-aid from the government-general to provinces may appear in the budget of the government-general and also in the provincial budgets.

	In 1/000 yen	Percent of total
Government-general	208,602	74.4
Provinces	34,610	12.4
Municipalities	36,961	13.2

Thus three-fourths of all revenues pass through the hands of the government-general; compared to it the local administration is of trifling importance, and we may therefore concentrate our attention chiefly on the budget of the government-general."

4:Grajdanzev--161 [2] S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 631, 177.63 Japan
636.63

"Let us now examine the local government administration of Taiwan. It is divided into five provinces, three districts, fifty-one counties and nine cities. Districts are formed in less developed regions—Taito, Karenka (in the East) and Boko (the Pescadores)."

6: Kirchhoff--38 U-4 (no date) 1895 Formosans-1-2
116, 631, 177.63 China
636.63

The administration of Formosa has become even more specialized and made even more independent in the last years. According to Hosie's report, the island has now been raised to the rank of an independent Chinese province under a governor directly responsible to the central government of the Empire. At the present he resides in Tai-pe-fu. At the same time the division of Formosa into three prefectures was ordered, each of them embracing a number of sub-prefectures (hsiën, ting, tschu). They consist of the following:

I. Northern prefecture (Tai-pe-fu).
   1) Hsiën Tem-sui,
   2) " Sin-tschu (or Hsin-tschu),
   3) " Y-lan (or I-lan),
   4) Ting Ki-lung.
II. Middle prefecture (Tai-uan-fu).
   1) Hsiën Tai-uan, *

* This district must consequently have its center of administration in a town called Tai-uan; we thought we should indicate this to be to the east of Tschang-hua, where Hosie's map shows a town called Tai-nan (obviously an error in lettering).

6: Kirchhoff--38
116, 631, 177.63
636.63

U-4

(no date) 1895

Formosans-2
China

2) Hsiën Tschang-hua,
3) " Jün-lin,
4) " Miao-li,
5) Ting Pu-li.

III: Southern prefecture (Tai-nan-fu).
1) Hsiën An-ping,
2) " Fung-schan (Feng-schan, as the English call it),
3) " Kia-y (or Kia-i),
4) " Heng-tschun,
5) Tschu Tai-tung (formerly the district of Pi-lam).

132 winds bring an annual precipitation of more than 120 inches. Frosts are frequent and the higher mountains are snow-covered during the winter.

Penghu Region

This region comprises the Pescadores Islands, and is subject to strong wind almost all year round. The average velocity of 15 miles per hour is recorded, but during December the velocity is as much as 20 miles per hour. The precipitation amounts to about 40 inches a year.

VII. POLITICAL DIVISIONS

• 631 On August 16, 1950, the administrative areas of Formosa were rearranged into five municipalities, 16 hsien, and Yangminshan Administration. The five municipalities are: Taipei, Tainan, Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Taichung. The sixteen hsien are: Taipei, Taoyuan, Miaoli, Changhua, Yunlin, Tainan, Pingtung, Hualien, Yilan, Hsinchu, Taichung, Nantou, Chiayi, Kaohsiung, Taitung, and Penghu (Pescadores).

621 for tax collection, conscription and cases of capital crime which were handled directly by the prefectural government. In this respect the situation in Formosa under the Manchu regime was the same as that on the Mainland. Within the village, the elder was elected, and approved by the local government. He had some assistants under him. Public affairs and minor crimes were decided and disposed of by the village elders. At times the new settlers drew up rules for the administration of local affairs, and affairs for common interest were discussed and decided upon by the council of householders.

648 Manchu control of Formosa was always
631 tenuous. Uprisings were frequent, and after the
669 first quarter of the 18th century internecine wars occurred incessantly. As the government was not strong enough to keep peace and order, self-defense was left to kinship groups or groups of the people of the same native town. In this situation the influential kinship group was very significant. If it was strong, not only could it defend its kinsmen better, but it could even suppress other groups and enjoy various privileges. A strong clan insured survival and prosperity, and this was the reason why an abur 'ance of male descendants became the ideal of life among the Formosan Chinese. This
[161] may account for the enormous rate of natural growth of Formosa's population which is still going on unabated. On the other hand, for defense against raids of aborigines and pirates, even the influential clan had to get the co-operation of other people. This led to territorial consolidation within the village.

631 669 As uprisings and clan wars became more frequent and widespread, often nearby villages united to make a league of defense. When one village was raided, a drum or gong would be beaten and the allied neighboring villagers would come to the rescue. To affirm their consolidation, common temples were constructed and common patron gods were worshipped. In rotation each allied village celebrated the yearly festival in honor of the patron god. In each case the allied villagers participated in the festival and feast. The blood tie was represented by the village ancestral temple, the territorial tie was represented by the local patronal god. Usually the worship of local patron gods was more frequent and enthusiastic. Sociologically speaking, it is safe to say that, in spite of the often emphasized Chinese ancestral worship and family spirit, the principle of locality took precedence over the principle of blood relationship during the Manchu period. As far as the mass of Formosan Chinese is concerned, this is true. However, in the case of a smaller number of the upper ruling class, the blood tie was still the dominant principle.

7. Breakdown of Folk Society.

612 178 631 Consciousness of the blood tie and locality bond was very strong among the Formosans in former times. When two persons found they had the same surname, they would consider each other as brothers or cousins. When a person introduced himself, he usually added his native

province. Associations of kinsfolk and associations of the persons of the same native town were organized in cities, and they performed a significant function as agencies for mutual protection and mutual aid. On the China Mainland, at least until recently, and among the overseas Chinese, these associations are still fairly active. So it was in Formosa up until the early years of the Japanese rule. Nowadays, many young Formosans do not even know exactly which prefecture is their native place on the Mainland. They pay little attention to ancestral shrines, and the remaining associations of kinsfolk or associations of the persons of the same native province no longer perform their former political and social functions. No doubt a radical change has taken place in the attitude of the people.

Since the Japanese administration proved able to keep peace and order with its vigorous police control, kin-groups and local associations for self-protection and mutual aid lost their significance. Gradually people became less eager to support these associations, and to the young generation, raised in peace and order, these associations became a thing of the past. With the administrative, industrial and economic improvement, self-sustaining and half-independent villages were integrated into an organic administrative system. Thus the folk society was broken down, and the people adapted themselves to modern political-economic system.

631 The colonial system was abolished after Formosa was restored to China in 1945. The Three Principles of the People advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen were adopted as the basis of politics and administration. It has been pointed out that under the Japanese rule certain advantages of modern technology were introduced "without... counterparts in social organization."[3] It is undeniable that organizational lag is a problem. Now, under the encouragement of the government, various organizations and associations are being promoted. Local self-government in particular is being strengthened. No doubt the development of education and the change from a colonial and dependent economy to an autonomous economy are incentives to stimulate active group co-operation. Social changes are inevitable, but time is too short to gauge how much and how fast the new developments will affect the general character of the Formosan society.

---

3. G. W. Barclay, Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan, Princeton University Press, 1954, p. 255.

175
631
666

Following the revolt of February 28, 1947, the new Chinese provincial administration accepted seven Formosan Chinese as commissioners in a total of fifteen. When K. C. Wu became governor, another effort was made to broaden the participation of local Chinese in government. The provincial commission was enlarged to include seventeen Formosans in a total of twenty-three. Greater number of local people were employed in the civil service. By June 1950, of the total of 81,006 persons employed by the provincial government, Formosans accounted for 53,024.[52] On August 16, 1950 the administrative areas were revised from eight hsien and nine municipalities directly under the province to sixteen hsien and five municipalities. Steps were immediately taken to promote self government in the province. The popular election of the magistrates of the sixteen hsien, the mayors of the five municipalities, the members of the hsien and municipal councils, and the members of the Provincial council was held for the first time in July 1950 and completed in March 1951. A new election took place in 1953-54. Since that time the election law has been modified so that future elections will take place on the same day in all sections of Formosa.

52. Fred W. Riggs, Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1952, p. 49.

45:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AD1 Formosa
~~AD1~~ AD1

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2a',
Political Background

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

175 Formosa has been the habitat of primitive people and lawless Chinese and Japanese since the dawn of its recorded history. In the early part of the seventeenth century, the Dutch and the Spaniards founded trading posts in Formosa and establishing the first organized community on the island. After a rule of 38 years, the Dutch were forced from Formosa by a group of Chinese who were loyal to the fallen Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Chinese governmental institutions modelled after those prevailing during the Ming period superseded the Dutch, until the Ming adherents were themselves ousted by the Manchu conquerors.

175 For two centuries, beginning in 1683, 131 the island of Formosa was a fu or prefecture of the Chinese province of Fukien. In 1887, by imperial decree, it was made a separate province. The island was ceded to Japan in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War. During the first twenty-five years of Japanese occupation the island was under military rule: the government was preoccupied with the quelling of revolts, and the governors-general were all military men. From 1919 to 1936 civilian officials were chosen as governors-general.

115 After 1936, in line with Japan's southward
63 expansion policy, the appointees were all admirals. The administrative system had undergone several revisions, the last revision occurring in November 1943.

63 Under the Japanese, Formosa was divided into five provinces (Japanese shu) and three districts (Japanese cho). The five provinces were located in the western part of the island, each placed under the supervision of a provincial governor. The eastern part of the island, which is mountainous and sparsely populated, formed two districts and the Penghu Islands (Pescadores) the third. The five provinces were subdivided into nine cities (Janapese shi) and forty-five counties (Japanese gun). The counties were further divided into towns (Japanese gai) and villages (Japanese sho). The administrative area of towns often embraced a considerable rural area. All areas not within a city or a town fell within the political boundary of a village. The two districts of eastern Formosa were subdivided into ten counties, and the counties into towns and villages.[1]

---

1. Hideo Naito, Taiwan, a Unique Colonial Record, 1937-38 edition, Tokyo, Kokusai Nippon Kyokai, 1938, pp. 64-74.

45:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AD1 Formosa
~~AD1~~ AD1

631 The governor-general was the head of
643 the government-general of Formosa. Appointed directly by the Japanese emperor, he wielded extensive and autocratic powers. He supervised the work of all administrative machinery, nominated all officials under him, and, with the exception of a few of the highest rank such as the governor of the provinces and districts, he could promote or dismiss the officials under him. He appointed half of the membership of the provincial assemblies. He had the right to suspend or cancel orders of the provincial governors, veto measures of the provincial assemblies, and dissolve the assemblies. He could impose on any person on the island, without recourse to the courts, imprisonment up to one year or a fine up to ¥ 200. He was assisted by a director-general of civil administration who supervised the secretariat, the various administrative bureaus, and the Central Research Institute, and an Office of Imperial Affairs which co-ordinated military and civil affairs.[2] When the governor-general was a military man, he was also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces on Formosa. If he was a civilian, he might request the local commander to make use of the military or

2. Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa, a Problem for United States Policy, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1952, p. 27.

631
643 naval forces for the maintenance of order.

647 Under the governor-general, were a secretariat, several administrative departments, which included home affairs, education, finance, police, communication, agriculture, and industry, and monopoly bureaus and research institutes. There was also an
645 advisory council with forty councilors, all appointed by the governor-general, who was its chairman. The term of office for the councilors was two years. "In case of necessity, however, the governor-general of Taiwan is authorized to relieve any councilor of his post before the expiration of his office term."[3] The prerogatives of the council were "to announce its opinions in reply to questions submitted thereto by the governor-general regarding important matters of administration."[4] The councilors were appointed from among high-ranking government officials and resident citizens "rich in scholarship and experience." "Clearly, this is a purely bureaucratic
646 institution. The people of Taiwan have no representatives in the Japanese Imperial Diet; they have no representative body which takes

3. The Organization of the Council, Imperial Ordinance No. 248, June 1, as revised on June 28, 1930 by Imperial Ordinance No. 128, Article IV.

4. Ibid., Article I.

answer to questions submitted to them by the local government authorities." The heads of towns and villages had no obligation to seek or to follow the advice of local assemblies. The governor-general could dissolve the assemblies at any level at will.

The exceedingly limited extent of "self-government,"[1] which the Japanese had much publicized, was further minimized by the franchise. Suffrage was granted to all self-supporting male Japanese subjects 25 years of age or older, resident in the relevant districts for more than six months, who have been paying for six months or longer a minimum local tax of ¥ 5.00 a year.[6] Formosan Chinese were counted as Japanese subjects, but because the majority of them paid a city, town, or village tax under ¥ 5.00 a year,[7] the number

---

6. Naito, op. cit., p. 73.

7. "The small landowners in Taiwan possess chiefly dry land and the majority of them own less than one ko (chio = 2.39 acres). But the village land tax from one ko of dry land is less than five yen and consequently the majority of owners, as well as all tenants and workers, have no right to vote." Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 163.

1 [During Japanese occupation from 1895 to 1945 -- Analyst]

631 of eligible voters among the Formosan Chinese
666 was extremely small. In 1935, the year in
641 which the so-called local self-government was introduced, there were 40,297 qualified voters among 270,674 Japanese residents, but only 187,155 qualified voters among 4,674,300 Formosan Chinese. The total membership, including government appointees of provincial, district and city assemblies as instituted in 1935, was 252 Japanese and 169 Formosan Chinese. Thus, not only were all administrative offices almost exclusively staffed by Japanese, but even in provincial and municipal representative bodies the Japanese members also far outnumbered the Formosan members.

625 For administrative control of the populace, the Japanese relied upon an elaborate police system. This system[8] comprised a civilian police force, numbering over 12,000 in 1940, supplemented by a special police force of over 5,000, functioning in the areas occupied by the aborigines and by a military police force numbering some 6,000. To facilitate the task of the police force, the old Chinese pao-chia system of collective responsibility was revived and strengthened. Approximately ten households formed a chia and ten chia a pao.

8. Ballantine, op. cit., p. 28.

625 committee and inhabitants' teams that exist under the Communist regime in Mainland China today. With the efficient espionage built on the pao-chia system, the Japanese were able to control every household in Formosa just as the Communists are using the inhabitants' organizations to maintain an effective check on every household in Communist-dominated China.

635 631 After World War II, the Chinese government took over the administration of Formosa and made the island one of the thirty-five provinces of China. However, the head of the provincial government was named administrator-general, and he was also commander-in-chief of the garrisons. The administrator-general exercised considerably wider power than a provincial governor; he supervised both the work of provincial machinery and the administrative functions assumed by the central government in the province. This arrangement was intended to be a temporary one during the period of the transfer of

authority.[10] The administrator-general was assisted by a secretary-general. There were nine departments in the provincial government which included the secretariat, civil affairs, education, finance, agriculture and forestry, industry and mining, communications, police, and accounts. In addition, there were the food bureau, the bureau of monopolies, and the trade bureau.

The five provinces of Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaoksiung and the three districts of Taitung, Hualien, and Penghu were converted into eight hsien [counties], each under a hsien-chang [magistrate], and the nine cities -- Keelung, Changhua, Tainan, Chiayi, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung -- in the five provinces were brought under the direct control of the provincial government at Taipei. Two new cities, Yilan and Hua-lien, were established and were placed under the

10. T'ai-wan Min-cheng Ti-i-chi [First Collective Report on the Civil Affairs of Taiwan], published by the T'ai-wan Sheng Hsing-cheng Chang-kuan Kung-shu Ming-cheng ch'u [The Department of Civil Affairs of the Office of Administrator-General], Taipei, May 1946, p. 104.

63/ jurisdiction of the hsien government in which they were located. The hsien were subdivided into chen [town] and hsiang [rural districts]. Towns and rural districts were further subdivided into ts'un [villages]. The cities were divided into ch'ü [districts, or sections] and ch'ü into li [wards]. A ts'un is composed of one hundred to two hundred households, and a li from one hundred fifty to three hundred households. Under the ts'un and the li is the smallest community organization, the lin [neighborhoods], consisting of six to fifteen households. Ts'un and li correspond to the former pao, and lin to the former chia, the designations having been altered to obliterate the unhappy associations the former names held for the people who were forced to live under the old system of pao-chia with its unrestrained police powers.

66 63/ Elections of local representative bodies took place in 1946. Franchise was extended to all citizens of both sexes over twenty years of age. Approximately 91.80 per cent of the eligible voters registered for voting.[11] The

11. Total number of registered voters was 2,409,560, First Collective Report on the Civil Affairs of Taiwan, p. 139.

~~6~~ election of hsien and city assemblies was
631 completed before April 7 and the provincial assembly (called the Provincial Political Council) was formally inaugurated on May 1. Although the functions of the local assemblies were principally consultative, they represented a great improvement over the Japanese system in two ways: first, the base for suffrage had been extended to include a greater number of voters, and, secondly, all the members of the assembly were elected. The election of district heads, magistrates, and mayors was deferred, because the authorities asserted the people at that time lacked administrative experience to undertake the work.[12]

635 After the local insurrection of February
6~~3~~7, 1947, the provincial administration was brought into conformity with that of other provinces of China. The post of administrator-general was abolished. A provincial council of fourteen members or commissioners, with the governor as chairman, was established. Half of the provincial commissioners were chosen from local residents, the Formosan Chinese. The monopoly bureau, whose restrictive activities were immediately responsible for the outbreak of riots, was

12. Ibid., p. 103.

45 Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AD1 Formosa
~~AD1~~ AD1

631 Toward the latter part of 1949 the Mainland of China was lost to the Communists. The Central Government of the Republic of China moved to Formosa. Formosa became both the seat of the national government and the provincial government. Thus, two levels of governmental mechanism exist side by side. In order to study the functions of the different branches of the government and the division of power between them, it will be necessary to examine the constitutional provisions and the structural organization of the central, provincial, and local governments.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2b.2,
Political Background

PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POPULAR ELECTIONS

I. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

631 Formosa was made a province upon its
632 retrocession to China after World War II. The Taiwan Provincial Government holds jurisdiction over the main island of Formosa, twelve smaller islands in adjacent waters, and the sixty-four islands of the Penghu group known to the Western world as the Pescadores. The total area of these islands is 13,880 square miles and the population, excluding the military, was 8,695,843 in February 1955.[1]

The capital of the province is Taipei, which is also the capital of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China in refuge. The provincial capital, according to a recent air defense plan, will move to Taichung when the necessary construction work in the latter city is completed.[2]

634 Taiwan Province is divided into sixteen administrative areas called hsien (a hsien is roughly comparable to a county in the United States) and five municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government. The

1. Report of the Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

2. According to a Taipei broadcast on Dec. 27, 1955, provincial capital was to move to Taichung in April 1956.

45: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AD1 Formosa AD1

631
L35

STRUCTURAL CHART OF TAIWAN



Fac p 367

[Facing p. 367 - part a]

45: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AD1 Formosa AD1

631
635



[Facing p.367 - part 6]

45: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AD1 Formosa AD1



[facing p. 367 - part c]

634 The following hsien are on the western slope of the mountain ranges: from north to south, Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Miaoli, Taichung, Changhua, Nantou, Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung. Three hsien cover the eastern slope of the mountains; these are Yilan, Hualien, and Taitung. The Pescadores form a separate hsien, Penghu. Two of the five municipalities, Keelung and Taipei, are located at the northern tip of the island, the remaining three, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, are on the western side of the island. The scenic resort, Yangmingshan, where President Chiang Kai-shek resides, is a northern suburb of Taipei and forms a special administrative district.

632 The sixteen hsien are each divided into chen (towns) and hsiang (groups of villages or rural districts). Chen and hsiang are further subdivided, respectively, into li (wards) and ts'un (villages). The five municipalities are dividied into ch'ü (districts or sections) and ch'ü are divided into li. A ts'un (village) is composed of 100-200 households and a li (ward) of 150-300. The smallest community organization is called lin (neighborhood) and consists of 6-15 households. In the province of Taiwan there are 82,290 lin which form 3,066 ts'un and 3,489 li. These ts'un and li combine to form 77 chen and 235 hsiang.[3]

631 635 At the head of the provincial government is the governor, who is the chairman of the Provincial Council. The Taiwan Provincial Council is composed of twenty-one members, six of whom are concurrently commissioners of provincial departments.

3. Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien [Yearbook of the Republic of China 1953], Taipei, 11/30/53, p. 643.

631
635 The Provincial Council meets once a week to listen to the reports of the various departments of the provincial government and discuss proposals brought up by the governor or the provincial departments. Although resolutions are passed or submitted to the Executive Yuan in the name of the Provincial Council, it appears in actual practice that the powers of the members of the council are limited to deliberation and final decisions do not depend on majority rule. The governor passes or vetoes each resolution.

According to the Chinese Constitution,[4] each province is to enact its own self-government law and the provincial governor is to be elected by the people of that province. In Formosa, since the provincial self-government law has not been enacted, local self-government is at present confined to the hsien and municipal levels. The provincial government remains under direct control of the central government. The governor is nominated by the president of the Executive Yuan and appointed by the president of the Republic. The department heads and members of the provincial council are selected by the governor and recommended to the Executive Yuan for appointment.

The Taiwan Provincial Government has a secretariat, headed by a secretary-general, and a number of administrative departments, each

---

4. Constitution, 1947, Articles 112 and 113.

63/635 under a commissioner or a director. The provincial legislature, called the Provisional Provincial Assembly, is the representative body of the people.[5] In 1951 its members were elected by the hsien and municipality assemblies. In 1953 the law was altered to permit direct election by the people.[6] The present assembly, composed of 57 members, was elected by popular vote in April-May 1954. A hsien or municipality with a population of 150,000 or less is entitled to elect one member to the assembly. If it has a population exceeding 150,000, it is entitled to elect one additional member for each additional 150,000. If the remaining population exceeds 75,000, the hsien or municipality may elect another additional member. When a hsien or a municipality elects four or more representatives, one of the members must be a woman. In the present assembly there are six woman members. The autochthonous tribes living on the plains elect one representative, those living in the mountains elect two representatives. The tenure of office of the present assembly is three years.[7]

---

5. So called because the provincial government is under the direct control of the central government, and the provincial council does not exercise full power.

6. Regulations governing the organization of the Provisional Provincial Assembly, promulgated by the Executive Yuan on August 22, 1953.

7. The tenure of the First Provincial Assembly, elected in 1951, was two years.

63/ Nominally the Provisional Provincial Assembly
636 possesses broad legislative powers. The provincial government has to present to the assembly for discussion and decision all measures affecting the rights and obligations of the people, the provincial budget, and the disposal of public property. However, the prerogatives of the assembly is circumscribed by a provision in the organic law of the assembly that in the event of a disagreement between the provincial government and the provisional provincial assembly, the former may request a reconsideration.[8] Should the assembly uphold its original resolution, the provincial government may submit the dispute to the Executive Yuan for final judgment. Moreover, when the assembly is in recess, the provincial government with the approval of the Executive Yuan may take any emergency action and report the matter to the assembly at its next session. Since the assembly meets for a period of ten to fifteen days every six months,[9] the provincial government is not seriously restricted by the assembly. The Executive Yuan has the right to dissolve the Provisional Provincial Assembly and order a new election, if it considers the assembly is acting in contradiction to national policy.[10]

---

8. Article 23.

9. In case of necessity a session may be extended, but the extension may not exceed seven days.

10. Article 24 of the Regulations Governing the Organization of the Taiwan Provisional Provincial Assembly.

II. HSIEN AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS

[636] 634 The province of Taiwan is divided into 16 hsien and 5 municipalities. At the head of each hsien government a hsien-chang (magistrate) and each municipality is headed by a shih-chang (mayor). In the hsien or municipal government, there are a number of bureaus in charge of civil affairs, finance, education, economic reconstruction, police, land, and public health. The number of bureaus varies according to the importance of the district and the size of its population. Each hsien or municipality has a representative body of the people called the hsien assembly or municipal assembly. The subdivisions of hsien and municipality are chen, hsiang and ch'ü, each headed by a chief. They have each a representative body of the people called chen or hsiang assemblies.

• 631 Local self-government was promulgated in Formosa in April 1950. All members of the councils of towns and rural districts, members of hsien and municipal assemblies, the heads of towns, rural districts, mayors of municipalities, and hsien magistrates were elected by direct suffrage. A second election took place in 1954. The term of office for magistrates, mayors, and heads of towns, rural districts,

633 and sections of a municipality is three years and the term office for the assemblies and local councils is two years. If a magistrate or a mayor commits a crime or fails to effectively carry out the order of a superior authority he may be dismissed by the provincial government or recalled by a referendum of the voters. In such case, a new election must be held within a month. Similarly, the administrative heads of a town, rural district, or section may be relieved of office by an order of the magistrate or mayor or by a referendum recall.

634 The hsien and municipal assemblies are authorized to decide on all matters related to local self-government (i.e., education, public health, communications, public utilities, and local industries), to sanction local budgets, to audit local expenditures, to decide on the disposal of local public property, to call for administrative reports, to make interpellations, and to issue hsien or municipal ordinances. The assemblies hold a session every four months and no limit is imposed on the length of each session. If the hsien or municipal government should find the resolution of the representative assembly difficult to enforce, it may, with the approval of the provincial government, request a reconsideration. If two-thirds of the attending members of the assembly support the original resolution, it becomes binding. The hsien and municipal assemblies are not subject to dissolution; evidently they possess a much greater latitude of power than the provincial assembly. The citizens' councils of towns and rural districts meet once every three months.

635 pating voters decreased slightly, but the actual
635 number of people who cast their votes in subsequent elections increased. For instance, in the election of hsien and municipal assemblies the total number of votes cast in 1950 was 2,769,696; the number of votes cast in 1953 totalled 2,961,941. Of a total of 1,846 candidates, 860 members of the hsien and municipal assemblie were elected in 1953. Seventy-four members were women.

631 The educational background of local
635 legislators is much lower than that of the members of the Legislative Yuan. Over ninety per cent of the members of the current Legislative Yuan are college graduates; of the 860 members of the hsien and municipal assemblies, only 202 are graduates of universities or technical colleges, 342 are graduates of high schools, and the remainder attended primary schools or were privately tutored.

The occupations of the members of local legislatures have been reported as follows:[19]

---

17. Number of civilian population on Formosa in February 1955 was 8,695,843; number of qualified voters: 3,997,226, according to report of Civil Affairs Dept. of Taiwan Provincial Government.

18. The China Handbook 1954-55, pp. 474-76.

19. Reports of the election offices, Dept. of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government.

G31/635 Farming	273
Mining	15
Manufacturing	31
Transportation	16
Trade	228
Professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.)	126
Civil Service	104
Others*	67

* Including 39 housewives and 17 retired industrialists and merchants

Of the 860 members of the hsien and municipal assemblies, 806 are native-born and 54 are Mainlanders. The magistrates and mayors elected to office in 1954 are, with two exceptions, all native-born. The exceptions are Kuan-i Hsieh, the mayor of Keelung, the largest port city of Taiwan Province, and the magistrate of Penghu hsien, Yü-lin Li. Hsieh and Li came to Formosa after World War II. The preponderance of Formosa-born candidates elected to the local governments and local assemblies suggests that the Nationalist Government is willing to encourage self-rule in Formosa. After the local election of 1950, one American observer concluded: "That the Taiwanese are making headway toward local political responsibility is clear." [20]

20. Fred W. Riggs: Formosa Under Nationalist Rule, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952, p. 52.

631 At the provincial level, 16 of the 21 members
635 of the provincial council are native-born, and the secretary-general, the commissioners of the provincial departments of civil affairs and reconstruction, and the directors of the department of health and the food bureau are natives of Formosa. It seems likely that as Formosa-born persons gain experience in government they will demand broadened jurisdiction for the provincial assembly and the election of a Formosan as governor of the province.

642 that whenever the country was unified, we had a time of peace and tranquility, and whenever the country was split, we had anarchy."[2] Federal system, such as existing in the United States, in which vast powers are reserved to the local constituents, is alien to the Chinese conception of government.

642 It is true that the Constitution of the 643 Republic of China has devoted five articles[3] to the enumeration of the powers of the central and local governments, but it does not attempt to define the relation between the central and local governments. What those articles attempt to do is the distribution of administrative duties among the different levels of government according to expediency or convenience. Generally speaking administrative duties are distributed on the principle that whatever can most efficiently be done by the central government will be distributed to the central government. Provincial and hsien governments handle only matters of local interest and anything else that

2. Dr. Sun Yat-sen: Discource on Democracy, San-Min Chu-i [The Three People's Principles].
3. Constitution 1947, Articles 107-111.

642 the central government may assign to them.
631 The central government has the power of redemarcating the administrative divisions of the country at any time. For instance, before the last world war, Manchuria consisted of three provinces, but after the war the number of provinces was changed to nine. In normal times, the central government retains legislative and supervisory powers over practically all matters, and so far no occasion has arisen to call for the redefining of relations between the national and local governments.

631 On Formosa, since the loss of
635 Mainland China to Communism, a peculiar situation has been in existence. Taiwan Province has become the only territory over which the national government of the Republic of China exercises effective control. Two levels of governmental mechanism -- the central government and the provincial government -- have been operating side by side. Except the departments of foreign affairs and defense, administrative functions of all other departments of the central government are overlapping with those of the provincial government. Many foreign visitors are under the impression that most of the administrative powers of the provincial government are being exercised directly by the central government and that only limited residual powers are left to the provincial government. But the facts do not seem to

631 substantiate this contention. For instance,
635 in the realm of finance, all taxes with the exception of customs duties, are collected by the provincial government. The Bank of
[65] Taiwan, a provincial bank, takes over all the functions of the central bank. It issues currency notes, supplies foreign exchange, and acts as the fiscal agent both of the national and provincial governments. With
871 regard to education, only the Taiwan National
631 University is under the supervision of the
635 Ministry of Education of the national government. All other schools in the province, including the College of Engineering and the Normal University are under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government. Actually the different ministries in the national government have undergone so much consolidation after they had been moved to Formosa, that most of them are now maintaining only a skeleton staff.[4]

631 The relative importance of the Taiwan
635 provincial government does not, however, diminish the highly centralized authority of President Chiang Kai-shek, for the provincial

4. There are now 12,000 employees in the national government vs. 113,000 in the provincial government. Time, op. cit., p. 34.

government enjoys no autonomous power. The governor and all the personnel in key positions of the provincial government are all chosen by the President or at least appointed with his approval. Just like the men in high posts of the national government and the military command, only those considered absolutely loyal are appointed by him. President Chiang Kai-shek has often been criticized in his choice of personnel for rating personal loyalty to himself above everything else. This should not occasion surprise if one is familiar with Chinese history. Ever since the earlier Han Dynasty (202 B.C. - 23 A.D.) Confucianism has been the dominant political philosophy of China. Confucius was born in a time of growing political and social unrest. He sought to re-establish order and peace by advocating a beneficent monarchy with all its subjects loyal to the sovereign. Through the milleniums, in the interest of maintaining order and peace as well as perpetuating their rule, Chinese rulers honored and supported Confucius. The emperors always singled out personal loyalty as the criterion for appointment, and President Chiang is merely upholding a deep-rooted political tradition.

Then, China became a republic in 1912. For sixteen long years there were incessant strifes created by different military factions, and chaos gripped the country. With a thousand cadets of the Whampoa Military

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 ADl Formosa ADl

Japanese government officers could be stationed over the island to establish political order firmly.

This delay in extending their mastery over the whole of Taiwan was a disappointment to the Japanese. It spurred them to concentrate their efforts at organization on measures other than force to bring the inhabitants under control. Once set in motion after some three years' experiment and delay, their methods brought swift results. They encircled and isolated the aboriginal tribes in the hills, and introduced a refinement of old Chinese forms of keeping local order—the so-called *pao-chia* system.[10]

Private Corporations and Japanese Investment

Other measures followed to make the Japanese rule more effective. As the exercise of authority became more a matter of routine, the policy turned more and more to exploring improvements and enlargements of production. This progress in government can be traced in the annals of specific achievements, like the drive to raise rice yields[11] and the public health program. By 1905 the Government-General felt itself well enough established to take a detailed census of the population; the descriptive report of its procedures is the best evidence of a firm degree of control and competence in performing complicated administrative tasks in Taiwan.

For the next 25 years or more, until they began to shift their energies to preparation for World War II, the Japanese proceeded to work out their policies for Taiwan (outside of the Aborigine Territory) with scarcely a serious check.[12] This long interlude between two periods of tight regulation is sometimes known as one of official "liberalism" or laissez-faire toward business affairs. It can be so designated, however, only in contrast to the strictness that preceded and followed. In steady succession the government completed several major projects. It finished the land survey of the entire island, essential to all their later engineering works as well as to the desired

[10] The *pao-chia* system was a scheme for assigning joint responsibility to village and familial groups for the conduct of their members. Its operation and the reasons for its effectiveness are taken up in the following chapter.

[11] Mendiola, N. B. (1949), p. 76 ff.

[12] The Taiwanese efforts at insurrection, as for example recounted in OPNAV, Civil Affairs Handbook (1944), pp. 173-177, tended to be exaggerated by their instigators. Due to their own clumsiness, these were quickly put down by the Japanese, though not without some local disruption. Inside the Aborigine Territory, on the other hand, the Japanese devoted many years of hard fighting and frustration to "pacification," and did not hold the entire island securely until the mid-1920's, nor peacefully until almost 1940.

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

some competition for the more desirable lands near the coast. In order to maintain their accustomed manner of farming, many were forced to move inland, where they gradually dispossessed aborigines and the earlier Hakka settlers and pushed eventually to the foothills of the interior. These many-sided conflicts of interest gave rise to land tenures more complicated than those usually found in China. The result was a set of property customs that was to become confused and encumbering in later years.[1]

With agrarian land tenures, however, it is all too easy to mistake form for substance. The system of land tenures in Taiwan gained several features that are distinctive to itself, arising to incorporate new parties into an old system—the aborigines who first occupied the area, and Chinese who acquired land titles to profit from the arrival of immigrants. But, since these landed property relationships are of little interest to us from an antiquarian point of view, their lasting effects are more important: they contributed to a form of village organization that survived through the entire Japanese occupation down to the present.

The flow of migrants is remarkable in that it populated Taiwan, with little variation over the years, closely after the model of the South China coastal area.[2] The resemblance to the mainland went beyond forms of settlement and land utilization. Politically, under Manchu control the island was supposed to be assimilated into the administration of the rest of China. It was governed as a regular political division—first as a prefecture of Fukien and later as a province itself—by officials appointed directly from Peking.

Taiwan inevitably presented special problems of control. In the first place, it could be separated from easy communication with the continent; eventually it grew almost as accessible to the Western powers as to Peking. The device most relied upon to tie the area to China was a weak one. The authorities tried, futilely, to isolate it from all external contact. From time to time, they went as far as to restrict the entry of Chinese from across the Straits, though even this had little success.

[1] See Ch'en Cheng-hsiang (1950), pp. 41-43, and Kawada, Shiro (1928).

[2] The instances of alleged "radical transformation" of land tenures (Kawada, Shiro [December 1928], p. 88) were primarily fiscal measures to reassert the central government's share in revenues from the land. Such reforms often are superficial from the standpoint of village organization. By way of illustration, one of the early official acts of the Japanese in Taiwan was to sweep away a whole section of these archaic land titles. While these reforms cleared the way to regulate rural areas from outside, they scarcely made an impression on property relations within the villages.

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

Furthermore, higher officials were themselves aliens, responsible ultimately to the Manchu court. Their tenure depended on their standing in Peking. Special competence or energy in office was not an advantage—it could even be dangerous, by making them targets of rumor and innuendo. Careers were sometimes ruined on the suspicion that certain officials had separatist leanings or were friendly to foreigners. Personnel were transferred regularly, as in China, to remove them from temptations of familiarity with their offices. Their only safe path to success was to maintain stability in local affairs, and somehow to prevent civil discontent from turning into civil disturbance.

This system was calculated to engross its key officers in their personal relations with Peking. It proved to be more effective in ensuring loyalty than in promoting careful government or preventing corruption. There were few deterrents to peculation in office, which was respectable if prudently pursued, and surrounded by many opportunities—such as legal monopolies and illicit export trade—not present in China itself.

These limited and negative objectives of government invited continual lapses of internal rule. Being unfamiliar with local conditions, officials simply did not govern in rural villages. Throughout the countryside they kept the peace by intrigue with powerful families rather than through actual administration—families that relied heavily on property obligations among the peasantry to uphold their influence. The situation put a strain on the administration's own underpinnings, and led to severity in abuses and civil strife to which the mainland itself was unaccustomed. It is a testimony to the serviceability of traditional Chinese institutions that they survived this test.

Whatever its internal shortcomings, this scheme of political order was well suited to rebuff foreigners, at least foreigners whose advances were not backed by force. Acute frustration among the Western commercial agents in Taiwan stands as evidence that it was accomplishing this part of its purpose. They complained bitterly that officials had connived at Taiwanese violence against Europeans and had even incited such incidents.[8]

The best information available about Taiwan's external contacts is contained in the published reminiscences and travel accounts of foreign trading representatives. The literary interests of these men throw light on the main preoccupation of their trading activities.

[8] For example, see Pickering, W. A. (1898), Ch. 17.

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 ADI Formosa ADI

this nominal government policy existed within Taiwan's rural villages. The bulk of the population was made up of peasant farmers and small tradesmen, who supplied the commodities for most of the export trade. The fact that their products were exported did not bring them into closer touch with outside markets. Farming and other village activities did not reach beyond local boundaries; the arrangements for disposing of farm produce, as we have seen, were in different hands.

The rural population led a settled existence. Taiwan being a small area, travel between places was not uncommon, but it was rare for families to change residence from one part to another. With poor roads and chronic banditry, even minor journeys entailed some hardship and risk and so were undertaken chiefly for exceptional purposes. The same difficulties hindered the movement of commodities. Internal markets had not been very effectively developed to transfer articles of ordinary use from town to town; reports tell of wide variation in prices for standard items such as food, and of prohibitive hazards to products in transit.[5] Often products could be shipped to the coast and on to China more easily than to points elsewhere in the island.

Local stability fostered local solidarities. The inconvenience of communication helped rural settlements to become close-knit communities, by segregating certain cleavages and antagonisms that the Chinese had brought with them from the mainland. Many had come from different localities in Fukien and Kwangtung, and had maintained their ancestral clan affiliations. Members of these groups frequently settled together and did not intermarry with others. Even many years after annexation by Japan, the Japanese found that several communities had kept themselves free of mixture with other groups. For these various reasons, village organization in many respects became self-contained and self-sufficient.[6]

Property institutions helped to buttress the stability in these small communities. In Taiwan, as in China, land ownership was the only durable form that substantial wealth could take. It was durable

[5] Takekoshi, Yosaburo (1907), pp. 252 and 269-270.

[6] The turbulent history of Taiwan has been carelessly represented as one of indiscriminate civil disorder, its early population as "unruly." It is noteworthy that most of the disturbances apparently followed the lines of cleavage above. Far from portending a breakdown of tradition within the Chinese settlements, these incidents were contests of strength between distinct parties—powerful clans, government forces, and aboriginal tribes. None was directed against the form of the social order itself, and none ever threatened that order.

52:Barclay S-5 (no date)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

against climate and short-term deterioration in use, against destruction through violence, and against decline in the income that it produced. Since the farming population was increasing within a fairly definite area, it had additional value in speculation. Land was also relatively safe against confiscation by the government; not only could its ownership be hidden from casual inspection, but the government itself depended on the obligations owed to landlords by tenants to uphold its authority. Under agrarian conditions of farming on a small scale it is impossible to cultivate large holdings of land under a single management. Hence, the only way to amass large wealth is to become a landlord—beyond some point, necessarily an absentee landlord. In early Taiwan, considerable concentration of landholdings was reported. Ownership tended to gravitate into the control of large and powerful families, whose influence was the only recourse of government officials in asserting their rule.[7]

On the economic side, this concentration of wealth was not given a chance to develop into industrial-type investment. The landed gentry, often landed on considerable scale, were the only group of persons who had access to sufficient income to become capitalists.[8] Practically, however, it proved more secure and profitable to let out their lands to tenant farmers. When they branched out into different enterprises, it was as an adjunct to their status as gentry. In South Taiwan, for example,

> ". . . sugar was manufactured from the cane grown upon the owners' plantations, or from that brought from elsewhere. The cane was grown by the tenants, or by those who through being heavily indebted to the landowner stood in the same relation as retainers . . . under it [this system] the master of the sugar factory secures a threefold profit.
>
> 1. As landlord, he claims from his tenants from 15 per cent. to 20 per cent. of the cane as rent.

[7] One might suspect that, as in China, members of these families *were* the officials at lower levels of administration. But there is no direct evidence on this point, aside from frequent references to the fact that *clan* solidarity, imported to Taiwan by the migrants from South China, was one of the few bases for organizing any kind of joint action by Taiwanese on a large scale.

[8] The government was unable to fill such a role itself for reasons already noted. Officials, who were not permanent fixtures in Taiwan, confined their acquisitive energies to foreign commerce, where returns were quicker and they did not need to make long-term commitments. For example, it is significant that the government almost never operated its own monopolies, but let them out to many private agents and taxed the products as they were exported.

52:Barclay S-5 (no date)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

2. As capitalist, he secures 14 per cent. to 24 per cent. interest on all the money he may have loaned to his tenant.
3. In order to cover the running expenses of the sugar factory he, as master, appropriates half the cane brought in by his tenants.

"These vast profits leave very little for the poor tenants, who have therefore no means of improving the soil, but fall deeper into debt, until at length they become mere slaves of the sugar factor. This system has proved the greatest hindrance to the growth of the business."[9]

Establishment of Japanese Authority

Japan's objectives in enlarging its Empire required a more energetic administration. With the background of past failures, it is understandable that the Japanese who first arrived in Taiwan met difficulty in trying to impose this kind of rule. It quickly became evident that neither profit nor political dominion was assured to them without some extraordinary measures.

Japanese first installed themselves in economic life exactly where outsiders had done so in the past—at the periphery of traditional marketing and property relations. They remained most active, as we have seen, outside the realm of agriculture proper. Through their steps in gaining access to the old agrarian institutions, we can now begin to see how far these changes impinged on agriculture itself. The Japanese did not proceed by sheer force, nor simply in a form of "economic penetration." The control was made effective by wedding the two channels—business and government—and by manipulating the pre-existing situation from a few vantage points at the outside. To make a success of this endeavor, the Japanese found it expedient to leave much of this rural social structure almost intact, and turn its basic features to their own account.

Histories of Taiwan over this period usually emphasize only the opposition to the new government that was overt and armed. But it was not by military conquest that the Japanese eventually secured the lowland area of the island. The military aspect was over quickly. Organized resistance collapsed by the end of 1895. Within a year or so after formally taking possession, Japanese became aware that direct attempts to alter the old rural state of affairs were too costly and slow, and were ineffectual against guerrilla bands that had wide-

[9] Takekoshi, Yosaburo (1907), p. 243.

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

spread local support. Their program to govern the countryside directly was a recognized failure as early as 1898.[10]

Starting with the issuance of *pao-chia* regulations in that year, the policy was revised with a view to getting less ambitious results, but more quickly. These were rules of conduct imposed on inhabitants of villages and smaller towns, under the threat of punitive action against the whole community. Virtually all Taiwanese outside the Aborigine Territory (with special provisions applying to certain cities) were assigned to household groups (*chia*), which were in turn grouped into village units (*pao*) for supervision. Responsibility for law observance and public order was allotted jointly among the households of each village. Positions of authority, carrying explicitly defined duties, were conferred on heads of prominent (i.e., wealthy and influential) families.

The system was based on a shrewd practical knowledge of those customary obligations that were most binding among Taiwanese. It was a move toward fitting the treatment of opposition to its roots instead of to its symptoms. By making the regulation of villages follow lines of kinship and property, these measures in effect were insinuated into the indigenous social structure of the population.

The rules placed a multitude of specific duties upon each *chia* as a group. The *chia*, through its head, was responsible for reporting all events such as births and deaths occurring within it, for reporting and controlling all movements of persons in and out of its area along with the conduct of the permanent residents; it put into effect the earnest health and sanitation rules that were often promulgated; it mobilized labor from its ranks for road-building and irrigation projects as directed from above; it was required to disseminate instructions for crop improvement and soil maintenance, bearing its own expenses; it supplied men for auxiliary police service, supported its own school facilities, assessed fines among its members, collected many taxes, and could be called upon to enforce additional rules decreed by prefectural governors.[11] These latter features in fact proved so attractive in avoiding the costs of more formal administration that the Japanese kept the regulations in full force throughout the entire span of their rule.

[10] Yanaihara, Tadao (1929), pp. 220-223.

[11] See OPNAV, Civil Affairs Handbook, *Takao Province* (1944), pp. 49-51; also Hsü Tzu-wei (1946), p. 160 ff. This latter author calls the *pao-chia* system "the most effective instrument for destroying organized Chinese resistance to the Japanese."

52:Barclay S-5 (no date)1954 ADl Formosa ADl

On a much smaller scale, Japanese replaced Chinese as immigrants. Chinese arriving from the mainland were given a distinct legal status as aliens. Their activities were restricted, and they were no longer allowed to merge with permanent Taiwanese residents. Practically all movement by Taiwanese thenceforth consisted of internal migration, redistributing the population that was already there.

Only a part of the island is level enough to have encouraged heavy agricultural settlement; almost half of the total area is more than 500 meters above sea level. For administration, and therefore for the census, Taiwan was separated from 1920 on into seven main divisions. Two of them, plus an eighth for P'enghu (the Pescadores Islands) off the West coast, were technically under a different sort of political organization; but for convenience we shall refer to all eight as *Prefectures*.[2] Most types of census and registration statistics were tabulated for each of these political units as well as for the total island.

Beneath the level of Prefectures, local administration was organized around a set of Districts and a smaller number of Municipalities. In the population statistics, these formed two parallel units: no District contained a Municipality, and both were subordinate to Prefectures.[3] There were seven Municipalities at the census date in 1930, raised to nine before 1935, and 53 Districts in both years; in comparisons of different years, all will be standardized to the arrangement in 1935. Inside each District were towns and villages. Few materials are available for these individually; for most purposes the smallest divisions that can be studied are the Districts.[4]

Finally, the mountainous interior region—the Aborigine Terri-

[2] If not literally accurate, the term is appropriate in that authority below the Government-General was highly centralized in the subordinate governors of these divisions. How they are designated here is a matter of no consequence, as it made little difference in the actual administration. P'enghu, scarcely known to Westerners except as the Pescadores Islands, was in 1926 made a separate division under the Government-General. Prior to this it had shifted between separate status and a subdivision of Kaohsiung Prefecture. Hence there is no unbroken series of data for it.

[3] Again, the details of political organization were not uniform, but that need not concern us here. Both terms are arbitrary: "District" for the term *chûn* (in its Chinese reading), and "Municipality" for *shih*. It was the practice to form new municipalities by removing some important town of sufficient size as a unit from its surrounding District, sometimes adding some former villages, also intact. This practice gives a basis for identifying the population of cities for comparison over a period when such administrative changes were taking place.

[4] The area of towns and villages exhausted the entire area of Districts, leaving no space between their boundaries. Therefore they do not always refer to meaningful units of settlement, and the terms are not consistent.

52:Barclay S-5 (nodate)1954 ADl Formosa ADl

659
631

tory—was put under special control (though it nominally fell inside some part of each prefecture). This area must be considered as a separate division of the island. Its actual conditions and the quality of its population data are distinct from the remainder. Japanese were secretive about their treatment of the Aborigine Territory, and we have little information about it that is dependable.

These civil divisions were the outcome of some experimentation in government administration. The scheme just described was put into essentially its final form in 1920. Accordingly, most comparisons involving internal boundaries cannot be carried back beyond that year.

161

The Distribution of Total Population and of Migrants

In 1930, the population of Taiwanese was divided among the Prefectures as indicated in Table 19. Data in this form do not readily

TABLE 19

TOTAL POPULATION OF TAIWAN, 1930

By Prefecture, Inside and Outside the Aborigine Territory

(All Ethnic Groups)

	Area of Regular Administration			*Aborigine Territory*		
Prefecture	*Population*	*Density: Persons Per Sq. Km.*	*Density As % of Average For Total Island*	*Population*	*Density: Persons Per Sq. Km.*	*Per Cent*
Taipei	896,380	328.0	141	17,151	9.4	4
Hsinchu	641,479	243.9	105	23,232	11.8	5
Taichung	990,571	279.3	120	24,975	6.5	3
Tainan	1,155,287	233.9	100	4,359	9.0	4
Kaohsiung	601,547	210.5	90	31,772	11.1	5
Taitung	46,182	46.2	20	12,619	5.0	2
Hualien	72,555	53.7	23	14,304	4.4	2
P'enghu	60,124	473.9	204	—	—	-
Total Island	4,464,125	232.7	100	128,412	7.6	3

Source: *Census of 1930, Statistical Tables*, Table 11.

reveal relative concentration and dispersion of people. The real centers of population, if we disregard for a moment the dense settlement in the largest cities, were in portions of Taichung and Tainan

82:Steiner S-4 (no date) 1951
AP1 China
FORMOSA AP1

and those which are delegated to it by the central government. Such matters as local self-government, division of administrative areas, forestry, industry, mining and commerce, educational system, banking, commodity control, navigation, public enterprises, land registration, and police system are legislated by the central government and may be delegated to the provincial authorities for execution. Matters pertaining to agriculture, commerce, industry, education, finance, taxation, and enterprises and cooperatives which are provincial in nature may be legislated by the provincial government.[10] In actual practice, important legislation concerning Taiwan is enacted by the National Government and administered by the provincial authorities.

The Taiwan Provisional Assembly, functioning as constituted May 1946, exercises a limited range of legislative powers. It considers "administration policies and activities and the provincial budget." Pending its development into a constitutional representative body, its decisions are subject to the veto of the National Government.[11]

The Governor of Taiwan is appointed by the Nationalist Government. Under him are various departments, bureaus, agencies, and province-operated enterprises. To draw an over-all picture of specific Nationalist policies pertinent to political, economic, social, and military activities on the island, the following analysis, necessarily brief, may be helpful.

Administrative Structure

The political organization of Taiwan follows a pattern of centralization, using

[10] For the division of powers, see Constitution of the Republic of China, Arts. 107–109.

[11] For details regarding the Assembly, see Chinese Constitution, Arts. 112–120; also Han Lih-wu, *Taiwan Today*, Taipeh, 1950—quotation at pp. 31–32.

642
631
[p. 215 (B)]

AF1 China
FORMOSA AF1

631 urban centers as 'administrative units. The island is presently divided into sixteen counties and five province-controlled municipalities. Under them are various districts, townships, and villages.[12]

632 634 666 Within this framework of centralized control is carried out the program of encouraging local self-government. As of May 6, 1951, all the twenty-one mayors and county magistrates had been successively elected to their respective offices by popular vote.[13] Besides, there are 6,304 village and *li* (urban units akin to wards) assemblies learning self-government by doing. Representing them in township and district assemblies are some 8,024 village and *li* delegates.[14] On county and municipal levels are some 541 popularly elected councilmen.[15] Of an estimated 2,650,000 men and women of twenty years of age and over who are qualified to vote, some 2,416,072 had registered.[16]

647 Along with the development in local self-government has been an increase in the participation of local inhabitants in the management of their provincial affairs. It may be recalled that under the Japanese, of 84,559 government personnel in 1945, 55.53 per cent were Taiwanese, and the rest Japanese.[17] In June 1950 the total number of govern-

[12] See Provincial Government of Taiwan, *Report on Administrative Reorganization**, Taipeh, 1949; also Democratic Publications Association, *Taiwan Reconstruction** (Taipeh, 1950), Vol. 1, pp. 1–12.

[13] The Broadcast of Voice of Free China, Taipeh, April 28, 1951 reported the conclusion of nineteen local elections with the remaining two to be completed by May 6, 1951.

[14] April 1948 figures. Also see *Taiwan Reconstruction**, cited note 12 *supra*, pp. 7–12. The terms of office of the delegates have since been extended by the National Government to such time as "formal assemblies shall be constituted."

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] 1947 figure. See *Taiwan Reconstruction**, cited note 12 *supra*, p. 7.

[17] For a breakdown of government person-

[P. 216 (A)]

625 wine, tobacco, and salt in violation of government monopoly, and violations of the 37.5 rent reduction program.

Conclusions

643 In describing the Nationalist government policies, 1949–51, the writer has sought to ascertain their nature and contents by recounting a chain of events which set the political pattern in contemporary Taiwan and by a survey of what has taken place since. From them may be drawn the following tentative conclusions:

1. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters have been exercising a dominant role in National Government policies, 1949–51.

665 2. While there are three known political parties active in national politics in Taiwan, the Kuomintang, as presently constituted, is the ruling party.

631 3. The political framework in Taiwan may be described as one of over-all political control by the Nationalist government, centralized management by the provincial government, and local self-government, still in its preliminary stage, at the municipal and county levels.

652 4. The National Taiwan currency has exhibited a degree of stability which compares favorably with that in most postwar countries having suffered from war devastation.

5. Nationalist government assets and reserve, sale of government properties, and ECA assistance are contributing factors in balancing the provincial budgets in recent years.

427 6. The 37.5 rent reduction program has contributed towards rural well-being, along with the projects sponsored by the Joint Committee on Rural Rehabilitation.

433 7. There has been an upward trend in agricultural and industrial produc-

[p. 222 (8)]